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L STATEMRNT OJ<'THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
Since its enactment in 1976, the Idaho Supreme Court has never interpreted the '"similar
community" provision of Idaho Code Section 6-1012. The Court has come close on at least one
occasion. This case presents the Court with an opportunity to construe the statutory language.
This is a medical malpractice lawsuit arising out of negligent care provided by David
Chamberlain, D.O. (Chamberlain) to John Wickel (Wickel). In 2012, Wickel sued Chamberlain
for malpractice involving the performance of a hemorrhoidectomy during January 2010 in Idaho
Falls, Idaho. Chamberlain moved for summary judgment to dismiss Wickel's claims in 2013. The
district court granted summary judgment and excluded the affidavit of Wickel's expert witness,
Dr. Joseph A. Scoma (Scoma) on July 25, 2013, four days before trial. Wicke! filed a motion for
reconsideration in August 2013. The district comi ruled that Scoma had foundation to testify
about the Twin Falls standard of care but that there was insufficient evidence in the record to
establish that Twin Falls is a similar community to Idaho Falls. Wickel then appealed.
Subsequently, this Court informed the district court that no final judgment had been
entered in the case. On remand, Wickel filed a second motion for reconsideration along with a
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Joseph A. Scoma. The district court denied the motion on
'jurisdictional" grounds. Wickel then filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.

B. Course of Proceedings.
Wickel filed a Complaint and Jury Demand against Chamberlain on January 3, 2012. (R
Vol. I, pp. 12-16.) Chamberlain filed his Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on
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January 17, 2012. (Id., pp. 17-23.) The case was assigned to Judge Jon J. Shindurling who set a
jury trial for July 29, 2013. (Id., p. 25.)
Chamberlain filed a motion for summary judgment on February 26, 2013, along with
Chamberlain's affidavit and an affidavit of counsel. (Id., pp. 40-94.) On March 22, 2013, Wickel
responded to the motion for summary judgment and submitted Scoma's affidavit, the at1idavit of
Jessica Wilson, a Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA paralegal, and an affidavit of counsel. (Id., pp. 95108.) After receiving the submissions from Wickel, Chamberlain vacated the hearing on his
motion for summary judgment. 1 Chamberlain filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Strike Scoma's affidavit on May 28, 2013. (Id., pp. 121-23.)

Wicke! responded to the Second Motion for Summary Judgment on June 17, 2013. (R
Vol. II, pp. 196-224.) Chamberlain filed a Motion to Strike Olson Uv1E2 and FDA records on June
24, 2013. (Id., pp. 225-27.) Chamberlain filed a Reply Memorandum on June 24, 2013. (Id., pp.
228-50.) Wickel moved to strike J. Michael Wheiler's affidavit submitted with the Reply
Memorandum. (Id., pp. 293-95.) The motions were heard by the district court on July 1, 2013.

(Id., pp. 401-02). The district court granted Chamberlain's motion to strike Scoma's affidavit and
granted the motion for summary judgment on July 24, 2013. (Id., pp. 405-13.) The district court
entered a document entitled "Final Judgment" on July 30, 2013. (Id., pp. 416-17.)
Wickel filed a Motion for Reconsideration along with a Memorandum and Supplemental

1 Due to the fact that Chamberlain vacated the hearing on the first summary judgment, the briefing submitted is not
in the record for the Court. The affidavits submitted in association with the first motion are in the record because
both parties relied on those affidavits in the briefing and argument on the Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
2

This move was inherently confusing since Olson's IME report was generated at Chamberlain's request.
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Affidavit of Dr. Scoma on August 12, 2013. (R Vol. Ill, pp. 420-49.) Chamberlain filed a
Response to the Motion for Reconsideration, a Motion to Strike Scoma's Supplemental Afiidavit,
and a Renewed Motion to Strike Exhibits from the affidavit of Wickel's counsel on August 19,
2013. (Id., pp. 450-63.) The Court denied the Motion to Strike the Supplemental Affidavit of Dr.
Scoma but also denied Wicket's Motion for Reconsideration. (Id., pp. 526-41.) The district court
found that Scoma had foundation to testify as to the Twin Falls standard of care but that there
was insufficient evidence in the record to establish that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are similar
communities. (Id.) Wickel appealed on October 15, 2013. (Id., pp. 542-47.) Chamberlain filed
his Notice of Cross-Appeal on October 23, 2013. (Id., pp. 562-66.)
On October 28, 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an Order Remanding to District
Court. The Order found that the district court had not entered a proper Final Judgment pursuant
to Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Order stayed the appeal and remanded
to the district court for entry of a Final Judgment.
Within 14 days of the Court's Order Remanding to District Court and noting that there
was no Final Judgment in the case, Wickel filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration on
October 30, 2013, along with a Second Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Scoma. (Id., pp. 574-88.)
The district court entered a Final Judgment on October 31, 2013. (Id., pp. 589-90.) On November
12, 2013, Chamberlain filed an Objection and Memorandum to the Second Motion for
Reconsideration and another Motion to Strike. (Id., pp. 592-607.)
On November 14, 2013, Chamberlain filed an Alternative Motion for Reconsideration
along with the aflidavit of Dr. James Richards. (Id., pp. 608-14.) The district court heard
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argument solely on the issue ofjurisdiction pertaining to the Second Motion for Reconsideration
on November 18. 2013. (Id., pp. 623-24.) On December 18, 2013, the district court issued its
Opinion and Order Denying Wickel's Second Motion for Reconsideration, finding that even
though no Final Judgment had been entered, and notwithstanding the provisions of Idaho
Appellate Rule 13 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11, that the district court would not hear
the Second Motion for Reconsideration. (Id., pp. 625-29.) Wickel filed an Amended Notice of
Appeal on December 23, 2013. (Id., pp. 630-35.)3 Chamberlain filed a Second Amended Notice
of Cross-Appeal on December 30, 2013. (Id., pp. 636-40.)
C. Statement of Facts.
John Wickel was 52 in 2010. He was raised in Long Island, New York and was trained as
a pilot in the Marine Corps flight school. (R Vol. II, p. 142.) Wickel was in the Marine Corps
from 1979 through 1987. (Id.) Wickel began flying as a commercial pilot for American Airlines
in 1987. (Id.) From 1990 to 1998 he was an active reservist for the Navy while still flying for
American Airlines. (Id.) Wicke! moved to Freedom, Wyoming in 1997. (Id., p. 145.) Wickel flew
"lines" or "routes" for American Airlines full-time until December 2009 when he was deemed
100% disabled to fly as a result of complications resulting from the surgery performed by
Chamberlain. (Id., p. 143.) In 2010, Wickel was prepared to move to wide-bodied aircraft,
assume international flights and to receive an increase in pay. (Id., p. 144.)
In October 2009, Wickel began experiencing increased pain from what he perceived to be
hemorrhoids. (Id., p. 146.) Wickel would treat the pain with over-the-counter remedies like
For some reason the copy of the Amended Notice of Appeal that is part of the record on appeal is missing page 5
of the Amended Notice of Appeal.
3
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Preparation H. (Id., p. 147.) In December 2009, he went to sec Dr. Kirk in Thayne, Wyoming for
medical treatment for the hemorrhoids. (Id.) Dr. Kirk ultimately referred Wicke) to Chamberlain,
a board certified general surgeon, for the first time on January 4, 2010. (Id., p. 148.)
Chamberlain is a board certified general surgeon who practiced medicine in [daho Falls,
[daho during 2010. (Id, pp. 152-57.) He practices with two other physicians, Drs. Eric Baird and
Brad Smith, under the name of Idaho Falls Surgical Specialists. (Id., p. 155.) Chamberlain is
trained on treating internal hemorrhoids using the Procedure for Prolapse and Hemon-hoids
(PPH). 4 Chamberlain received his training on the PPH procedure in 2002 when he and Dr. Baird
travelled to Salt Lake City for a training session sponsored by Ethicon, the manufacturer of PPH
devices. (Id., p. 157.) A Dr. Eyring, who resides and practices in Salt Lake City, Utah, trained
Drs. Chamberlain and Baird over the course of one day. (Id.) Chamberlain learned how to use
the device and observed Dr. Eyring's use of the device about three times. (Id.) After watching
three procedures, Chamberlain decided that he was adequately prepared to use the device on his
patients. (Id.) An Ethicon representative, who was not a physician, attended Chamberlain's first
time using the device "in case [he] had any questions." (Id.)
After Chamberlain met with and examined Wickel for the first time on January 4, 2010,
Chamberlain diagnosed Wickel with grade III internal hemon-hoids and external hemon-hoids.

(Id., p. 163.) Chamberlain admitted that he failed to diagnose Wicke! with an anal fissure during
the initial consultation. (Id.) Chamberlain scheduled Wickel to undergo surgery on January 8,
2010. (Id.) Wickel signed a surgical consent form for a "rectal exam under anesthesia with
4 The PPH procedure is a device that is inserted in a patient's rectum to pull in the internal hemorrhoids, cut off the
Hemorrhoidal tissue, and then close off the mucosa through the use of a staple. (Id., p. l 67.)
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internal and external hcmorrhoi<lectorny with PPB with harmonic scalpel." (Id., pp. 163-64.)
Prior to the surgery Chamberlain never discussed a potential cause of Wickel's pain as being the
anal fissure nor was treatment of an anal fissure discussed at the time of the surgery. (Id., p. 164.)

It was only aflcr Wickcl was in surgery, and under general anesthetic, that Chamberlain
discovered the anal fissure. (Id.) Chamberlain proceeded to perform a "fissurectomy and an
internal lateral sphincterotomy" 5 without informed consent (Id.) Chamberlain explained:
As I said before, with previous discussions with Mr. Wickel, we were-I was under a
good understanding that I felt that the patient wanted everything to be done to make sure
that this problem that he had been having was corrected. And I felt at the time of surgery
that I had that understanding and that to wake him up and discuss it with him would-and
I felt that his answer would be yes, I would want to have that done, and he would-and I
felt it would be not a good thing to have him have additional risks of waking him up and
having another anesthetic when I knew that was the gold standard of care and that he
would basically be delaying the inevitable.

(Id., p. 165.) Chamberlain acknowledged that although the risks of an internal hemorrhoidectomy
with PPH and external hemorrhoidectomy with harmonic scalpel could be the same as a
sphincterotomy, he did not discuss further risks Wickel. Chamberlain never informed Wickel that
a sphincterotomy involved the more complicated procedure of cutting the sphincter muscle. Such
further risks included damage to the sensory functions of the sphincter resulting in permanent
incontinence and pain. (Id.) Wickel testified that he would not have consented to the procedure
had these risks of a sphincterotomy been discussed. (App. Ex. 2, pp. 714-15.)
There was no specialized literature related to the PPH device or procedure other than
Ethicon's own guidelines. (R Vol. I, p. 165; App. Ex. 1, pp. 665-81.) It is undisputed that Ethicon

5 A fissurectomy consists of cauterizing the base and making a new wound to scar over and heal. (R Vol. I, pp. 16465.) The internal lateral sphincterotomy (ILS) was a bisection of the tissue to allow for relaxation. (Id., p. 165.)
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was the sole manufacturer of PPH devices in January 2010. (R Vol. I, p. 160.)
Chamberlain testified that he had not altered or changed his technique for using the PPH
device from how Dr. Eyring taught him in 2002. (Id., p. 16 L) Chamberlain testified that he
would use the PPH device "the same in any of my patients that [he] treats."' (Id.) The outpatient
facilities used by Chamberlain to perfo1m PPH procedures in Idaho Falls were of a quality that
Chamberlain did not have to modify the way he used the device. (Id., p. 162.) Wicket's
individual circumstances and particular condition did not cause Chamberlain to alter his
technique using the PPH device. (Id., p. 167.) There was no dispute that Chamberlain intended to
use the PPH device in the same manner consistent with his original training.
The evidence was also undisputed that Drs. Baird and Smith, Chamberlain's business
partners, were the only other physicians in Idaho Falls who performed PPH during January 2010.

(Id., pp. 106-08, 166.) Wickel contacted every general surgeon in Idaho Falls and Pocatello and
asked (a) whether he or she used the PPH device in January 2010 and (b) whether he or she
would be willing to speak with Dr. Scoma about the standard of care of health care practice for
PPH procedures in east Idaho. (Id, pp. 106-08.) These physicians either did not use the PPH or
refused to speak with Dr. Scoma. (Id.)
Ethicon's guidelines provided that proper use of the device should "keep the staple line at
least 2cm above the dentate line."6 (Id., p. 170; App. Ex. I, pp. 678 & 681.) Dr. Eyring instructed
Chamberlain that there were chances of increased pain the closer the staple line was to the

6 As elaborated, infra, the dentate line demarcates the rectum from the anus and is surrounded by the internal
sphincter muscle. Two centimeters is the minimum distance is that required to prevent injury to the sphincter and the
nerve system that enervates the sphincter muscle.
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dcntate line. (R Vol. I, p. 170.) In fact, Dr. James Olson, Chamberlain's own expert who
performed an IME on Wickel on April 15, 2013, stated the following in his report:
John experienced a significant amount of pain postoperatively. This is likely contributed
to by the placement of the staple line within the anal canal, in addition to the
development of a perianal abscess. The operative technique for PPH procedure currently
performed as noted in Mark Singer MD, et. al. (OCR Vol. 45, No. 3, 360-369)
recommends the purse string suture to be placed approximately 4 cm proximal [above] to
the dentate line ... While there have been modifications to the PPH technique where the
purse string suture may be less than 4 cm to the dentate line, it would be atypical that the
staple line reside in the anal canal.
(Id., p. 180, emphasis added.) Olson's statement is a description of the standard of health care

practice in the Boise community. 7
Chamberlain performed Wickel's hemorrhoidectomy via PPH in January 2010, along
with the aforementioned internal lateral sphincterotomy that Wickel never consented to
undergoing. (Id., p. 174.) Wickel experienced significant, abnormal pain post-operatively and
developed an abscess. (Id., p. 175.) Chamberlain saw Wickel in February 2010 and noted that a
perianal abscess was present. (Id.) Chamberlain drained the abscess at that time. (Id.) Wickel
subsequently saw a Dr. William Peche, a colorectal surgeon in Salt Lake City, Utah for a second
opinion. (Id.) Dr. Peche performed remedial surgery. His operative note states, in part, "[t]here
were no other internal openings or external openings identified. The patient had a previous PPH
and a staple line at the dentate line." (Id., emphasis added.)8
When asked about the staple line placement during his deposition, the best description

7 Ironically, after Olson reported this opinion, Chamberlain moved to strike the report, arguing that Olson, as a
Boise general surgeon, was unable to testify to the local standard of care and should only be allowed to testify to
causation. (R Vol. lI, pp. 225-27.)

8

This means that Chamberlain placed the PPH staples into the sphincter muscle.
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that Chamberlain could come up with for the "local '· standard of care was:

The standard of care would be to have-[ don't know if I can really tell you what the
standard of care is, but would not be abnormal--! guess l shouldn't say standard of care.
I should say would not be-would be acceptable. Would be acceptable to be both
proximal and distal.

(Id., p. 170.) Chamberlain then pmToted the statute defining the standard of care in Idaho Falls as
"what general surgeons in my situation under similar circumstances would have done." (Id. p.
171.) After this statement, Chamberlain refined his description of the standard of care:
Q. By Mr. Gaffney: Sure. Assuming that there are no other general surgeons in Eastern
Idaho that do PPH procedures, the only standard of care we've got locally is what is done
by the surgeons in your office, correct?
Mr. Wheiler: Same objection. [Object to form. Improper hypothetical]
The Witness: Do you want me to answer?
Mr. Wheiler: Sure. If you can.
The Witness: Yeah. The local standard of care would be for the people who do this
procedure locally. And of my knowledge, those are the only ones I know of.

(Id)
Wickel retained Joseph A. Scoma, M.D., as his expert witness to establish liability and
causation in this case. Scoma is a board-certified general surgeon, a board-certified colon and
rectal surgeon, is licensed to practice medicine in California, and has been in practice for over 30
years. He is familiar with the diagnosis and management of anorectal problems. (Id., p. 95.)
Scoma reviewed the medical records for John Wickel that have been produced in the case,
including the follow-up records of Drs. Peche, Bossart, and Murday (all Salt Lake City
physicians), the deposition and affidavit of David Chamberlain, D.O., the deposition of John
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Wicke!, additional documentation about the PPI I device as promulgated by Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc., a Johnson & .Johnson company. He also reviewed the Idaho Jury Instruction on
proximate cause: IDJI.2d 2.30.2. (Id., p. 96.) Wicke! submitted Scoma's at1idavit in opposition to
the Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
Scoma had actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice. f Iis
knowledge comes from his experience and training, as well as the deposition transcript of David
Chamberlain, D.O. the medical records that he has reviewed, and the guidelines for use of the
PPH device as promulgated by Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (Id.) Chamberlain testified that the
standard of care would be based on a similarly situated physician's practice. (R Vol. L p. 161.) As
a board certified general surgeon, Scoma was similarly situated to opine as to the standard of
care by virtue of his board certification based on Chamberlain's own testimony and the fact that
the Ethicon PPH device was used in the same fashion wherever it was available. (Id.)9
In addition, Scoma spoke with a general surgeon practicing medicine in Twin Falls,
Idaho: Stephen Schmid, M.D., a board certified general surgeon. (Id.; R Vol. III, pp. 420-22) Dr.
Schmid performed hemorrhoidectomies in January 2010 using the PPH device. (Id.) Schmid
informed Scoma that he was familiar with the procedure and that he performed
hemonhoidectomies using the PPH device in January 2010. (R Vol. III, pp. 420-22.) Schmid also
infmmed Scoma that there was nothing unique or special about the manner in which

9

Wicket asserts that where a medical device is used incorrectly and contrary to the manufacturer's guidelines, and
without any peer-reviewed literature that would justify such a deviation from the manufacturer's guidelines,
deviation from those guidelines should be tantamount to negligence per se. As discussed below, there is nothing
unique to Idaho Falls that justifies a physician's failure to ignore the guidelines and training provided by the
manufacturer.
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hcmotThoidcctomit=s were performed with the PPH device. (Id.) Schmid also infonned Scoma
that he had performed approximately 60-70 hemorrhoidectomies using PPH over the course of
his career. (Id.) He told Scoma that there were no deviations in how he had been trained to use
the PPH device in Twin Falls from its use anywhere else. (Id.) During their conversation he said
that the standard of care for general surgeons in Twin Falls would be the same regardless of
location, i.e., that the standard of care in Twin Falls was a national standard as opposed to
including any unique deviations from the national standard of care. (Id.) Schmid informed

Scoma that he had trained under the same Dr. Eyring that trained Chamberlain in Salt Lake City,
Utah, both prior 10 2010. (Id., p. 421.) Drs. Scoma and Schmid discussed the applicable

community standard of care and Scoma determined that the standard of care does not deviate
from the national standard of care and the national standard of care had supplanted any local
standard. (Id) Scoma testified that based on the information gained from Schmid, board certified
general surgeons in Idaho practice in conformance with the national standard of care. (Id.)
Wickel attempted to arrange for a physician located in Idaho Falls, Pocatello and the
surrounding communities to discuss the standard of care with Scoma. Jessica Wilson, a paralegal
for Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, called every general surgeon in Idaho Falls and asked whether
they used the PPH device. (R Vol. I, pp. 106-07.) The general surgeons she spoke with said they
did not use PPH to perform hemorrhoidectomies. (Id.) Other general surgeon offices declined to
speak with Scoma about the standard of care. (Id.) Wilson called every general surgeon in
Pocatello, Idaho and none of them used the PPH device nor would they speak to Scoma. (Id.)
Scoma testified that Chamberlain's performance of the original operation and
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management of Wickel's condition violated the applicable standard of care. Chamberlain's
failure to suspect or diagnose the anorectal fissure as the cause of Wickcl's pain breached the
applicable standard of care. (R Vol. I, pp. 95-105.) Scoma testified that Chamberlain's
performance of the hemorrhoideetomy with the PPH device also breached the standard of care.
(Id.) Chamberlain inserted staples at the "dentate line" or within the anal canal. (Id.) This
violated the standard of care because inserting a staple at the dentate line obliterates sensory
anatomy that is necessary for bowel control sensations. (Id) Moreover it violated Ethicon's
guidelines which mandate that the "muco-mucous suture be 'at least 2cm from the dentate line"'
to avoid the consequence of sensory deprivation and destrnction of the sphincter muscle. (Id.)
Scoma testified that Chamberlain also violated the applicable standard of care because he
"double-injured" Wickel. Chamberlain dilated Wickel 's anal canal to insert the PPH device and
then also performed a sphincterotomy. The PPH insertion would have been adequate to treat the
fissure that Chamberlain diagnosed following the insertion of the PPH device had the fissure
been properly diagnosed in the first instance. Chamberlain injured Wickel first by dilating the
anal canal (exacerbating the fissure) and second by performing the sphincterotomy in violation
of the standard of care. (Id.)
Chamberlain's treatment of Wickel's fissure and the fistula that developed violated the
applicable standard of care. (Id.) The fistula's opening was in the posterior midline. (Id) This
suggests that the fissure either was treated much too deeply and cauterized during Chamberlain's
initial surgery, in violation of the applicable standard of care, or that the fissure itself was a
fistula that Chamberlain failed to diagnose it as such. (Id.) The failure to recognize or diagnose
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the fissure as a fistula breached the applicable community standard of care. (Id)
Scoma also has the opinion that not only was Chamberlain's treatment and management
of Wickd's condition negligent but that it grossly violated the applicable standard of care for
Idaho general surgeons in 2010. (Id) The performance of the PPH procedure was done with
carelessness and a greater degree of negligence than would ordinarily be seen in the performance
of the PPH procedure. (Id) The guidelines established by Ethicon of having the suture line at
least 2cm from the dentate line exists for a purpose and that purpose is to avoid damaging the
sensory anatomy necessary for bowel control. (Id) There is also an increased chance of
persistent pain if the lower staple/suture line is in the anal canal. (Id) Chamberlain should have
known not to staple or suture at the dentate line, in the anus itself. Doing so was reckless and
outside any bounds of care that should have been provided to WickeL
The district court found that for purposes of the relevant community, "the local standard
of care [for Idaho Falls] was indetenninable and, in accordance with Hoene, Dr. Scoma was
allowed to familiarize himself with the standard of care in a similar community." (Id., p. 412.)
The district court went beyond the scope of Chamberlain's motion and ruled that there was
"insufficient evidence" in the record that Idaho Falls and Twin Falls were similar communities
and that Scoma had not demonstrated familiarity with the local standard of care. (Id., p. 412-13.)
The district court failed to articulate what evidence would be required to make this connection.
Wickel filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 12, 2013. (Id. Vol. III, pp. 420-49.)
A Memorandum of Law and a Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Scoma accompanied the motion.

(Id.) The district court expressly found that given the substance of the Supplemental Affidavit,
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Scoma had familiarized himself with the standard of care for Twin Falls. (Id., pp. 53 l-33.) The
district court decided, however, that even though Chamberlain never argued that Twin Falls and
Idaho Falls are dissimilar communities under Idaho Code Section 6-1012, that the district court
could consider the issue and held that Wicke! had not established that the two communities are
similar. (Id., pp. 533-36.) Thus, the district court allowed Scoma's Supplemental Affidavit into
the record, and also Scoma's prior affidavit as a result, but denied the reconsideration on the
issue of similarity of the communities. (Id., p. 540.)
After the case was appealed, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an Order Remanding to

District Court on October 28, 2013. The Order ruled that there "does not appear to be a final
judgment, pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(a), because it contains procedural history." (Order at 1.) The
Court remanded the case to the district court "to allow for entry of a Final Judgment that does not
contain a record of prior proceedings." (Id.) After receiving the Order Remanding to District
Court, Wickel filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration along with a Second Supplemental
Affidavit of Dr. Scoma, arguing that he was allowed to file the Second Motion for
Reconsideration because no valid Final Judgment had been entered in the case. (R Vol. III, pp.
574-88.) The district court denied the Second Motion for Reconsideration even though it
acknowledged that no valid Final Judgment had been entered in July 2013. (Id., p. 628.)
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IL

A. \Vhethcr the district court erred by
Reconsideration;

to hear Wickers Second Motion for

B. Whether the district court erred in finding waiver of the plaintiff's argument
that issues were not properly raised on summary judgment;
C. Whether the district court erred in striking the Affidavit of Dr. Joseph A. Scoma
and granting summary judgment to the defendant;
D. Whether the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff had failed to adduce
evidence generating triable issues of fact pertaining to the similarity Idaho
communities;

E. Whether the district court erred in failing to apply a national standard of care;
and,
F. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Wickel's informed consent claim.

III. ARGUMENT
A. The district court should have heard Wickel's Second Motion for
Reconsideration.
1. Standard of Review

"The district court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration."
Blackmore v. Re/Ma.\: Tri-Cities, LLC, 237 P.3d 655, 660 (Idaho 2010). "[A] trial court does not

abuse its discretion if it ( 1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) acts within the
boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the
decision through an exercise ofreason." Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 196 P.3d 341,350 (Idaho
2008).
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2. Argument

The district court abused its discretion in denying the Second Motion for
Reconsideration. Judgments are entered pursuant to Rule 58(a).

IDAIIO

R. Civ. P. 58(a) (2013).

This Court extensively addressed the substance of judgments and the consequences of failing to
have a compliant judgment in In re Estate <~f Holland, 279 P.3d 80 (Idaho 2012). The Court has
been clear that final judgments are not to contain any extraneous verbiage, regardless of how
innocuous that verbiage may seem. In Holland, the district court entered a Judgment of
Dismissal with Prejudice that contained a record of prior proceedings and identified prior
motions that had been filed, dates of hearings, and the court's rulings on the motions. Id. at 85.
This Court ruled that the October 6, 2010 Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice entered by the
district court did not constitute a valid final judgment under Rule 54(a) because of the excess and
improper verbiage. Id. The district court then entered a second document entitled Amended
Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice and this Court held that document "likewise did not
constitute a final judgment" and was similarly invalid. Id.
In this case, the Court ruled that the July 30, 2013 Final Judgment did not comply with
Rule 54. Due to the fact that the Final Judgment was invalid, the district court abused its
discretion in denying Wickel's Second Motion for Reconsideration. The July 30, 2013
"judgment" carried with it no legal effect on the case. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B)
clearly provides that a motion for reconsideration may be filed at any time "but no later than
fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." IDAHO R. C1v. P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). Wickel
filed his second motion within 14 days of the Final Judgment being entered in October 2013. The
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district court should have heard the motion. In its decision denying Wicket's motion the district
court agreed with Wickd on every issue, except it found that "the Supreme Court never intended
to alter the rights of litigants when

it remanded deficient final judgments for correction." (R Vol.

HI, p. 628.) The district court's statement lacks any authority, justification, or rationale. It
constitutes an abuse of discretion because it fails to apply the plain language of the applicable
legal standards in the case law and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. It is also unreasonable.
The consequences of the district court's refusal to allow Wickel to con-ect whatever
foundational issues it perceived on the similarity of communities are serious. Chamberlain did
not raise the issue as the moving party on summary judgment and the Idaho Supreme Court has
never addressed the issue. This Court has not set forth the standard in Idaho for establishing
similarity among Idaho's communities. The district court should have allowed Wickel to correct
any perceived errors in foundation because there was no prejudice to Chamberlain by allowing
Wicke! to do so. In fact, the district court had the opporttmity to make the correct decision when
this Court stayed the appeal and noted the absence of a final judgment. The district court went
out of its way to prevent the issue from being properly considered. The district court should be
reversed and the matter remanded.

B. The district court erred in finding waiver of the plaintiff's argument.
1. Standard of Review

In De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 2014 WL 1266104 (Idaho Mar. 28, 2014), the
Court outlined the standard of review following a grant of summary judgment. The Court wrote:
An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district court
uses when granting a motion for summary judgment. Under Rule 56( c) of the Idaho
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Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment
should be granted. In making this determination, all disputed facts are liberally construed
in favor of the non-moving party. Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of
material fact Inforcnccs that can reasonably be made from the record are made in favor
of the non-moving party. However, the non-moving party may not rest on a mere scintilla
of evidence. If the record raises neither a question of witness credibility nor requires
weighing the evidence, then summary judgment should be granted. The moving party is
entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case. (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

Id. at *3. On an appeal from summary judgment questions of law are reviewed de novo. Steel
Farms, Inc. v. Cn1fi & Reed, Inc., 297 P.3d 222,227 (Idaho 2012).

2. Argument
The district court upheld its summary judgment decision on the sole basis that there was
no evidence establishing that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are similar communities as defined by
Idaho Code Section 6-1012. (R Vol. III, pp. 526-41.) This was not an issue raised by
Chamberlain on summary judgment. It is improper for a court to decide an issue not raised by the
moving party. Harwoodv. Talbert, 39 P.3d 612 (Idaho 2001); Shelton v. Shelton, 225 P.3d 693,
698 (Idaho 2009); Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Idaho 1994);

Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 631 (8th Cir. Minn. 2003). Chamberlain's motion
raised just one issue for determination: Scoma lacked familiarity with the Idaho Falls standard of
care for general surgeons performing hemorrhoidectomies using the PPH device during 2010.

(See R Vol. I, pp. 109-37.) 10 The following illustrate the narrow scope of Chamberlain's motion:

10

It raised no issues as to the other claims asserted by Wicke!.
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.

Dr. Scoma did not speak lo a local Idaho falls practitioner. (Id.. p. 11 ! 4)

• There are no facts showing that Dr. Schmid ... had knowledge of the standard of
care for general surgeons in Idaho Falls .... (Id)

• Dr. Scoma did not ask Dr. Schmid if he had ever practiced in Idaho Falls, or if Dr.
Schmid had spoken with a general surgeon in Idaho Falls. (Id.)

• Dr. Scoma failed to make the necessary inquiries as to whether and how Dr.
Schmid was familiar with the local standard of care in Idaho Falls, Idaho during
January 2010. (Id., p. 116.)

•

Dr. Scoma did not even ask if Dr. Schmid had ever practiced in Idaho Falls, ifhe
had ever spoken with a general surgeon in Idaho Falls .... (Id., p. 118.)

Once the district court ruled that the standard of health care practice in this case was
indeterminable, the district court should have stopped its analysis and denied the motion for
summary judgment. Every legal basis raised by Chamberlain in his motion became irrelevant the
moment the district court found an indeterminable standard of health care practice in Idaho Falls.
The status of the case changed dramatically at that point.
The district court should not have decided the similarity issue because Chamberlain never
raised it. Instead, the district court improperly found that Wickel waived his objection to the
issue being decided based on the district court's incorrect reading of State v. Rubbermaid Inc.,
924 P.2d 615 (Idaho 1996).
Adjudicating the motions on issues that were not raised substantially prejudices Wickel.
His case was dismissed on grounds that were imported sua sponte into the litigation without a
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fair opportunity to respond. Ilad Chamberlain wanted an adjudication of the issue of similarity
then Chamberlain should have raised the issue in his motion. See ( 'umis Ins. Soc

y,

Inc. v.

Massey, 318 P.3d 932,935 (Idaho 2014) (finding that "the moving party bears the burden of
proving the absence of material facts ... .'') Dismissing a case when there has been no
evidentiary showing by a moving party deviates from the law governing summary judgment.
The district court relied on State v. Rubbermaid Inc., 924 P.2d 615, for its ruling that
Wickel waived his objection to the district court deciding an issue not raised on summary
judgment. Implicit in the district court's rnling and reliance on Rubbermaid is the

acknowledgement that Chamberlain did not raise the issue of similarity in the motion. If the real
issue on summary judgment was whether Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are "similar communities"
under the statute, then Wicke! should have had the opportunity, with the court's guidance, to
ascertain just what evidence would establish this element.
In Rubbermaid, the State of Idaho sued Rubbermaid under various tort theories for a fire
that caused $3.4 million in damages to the State Capitol Building. Id. at 617. Rubbermaid moved
for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) the State had not established that a Rubbermaid
wastebasket was involved in the fire; (2) the State could not establish a prima facie case of
defective design; and, (3) the State's allegation based on failure to warn failed for lack of duty
and causation. Id. The district court dismissed the State's case. Id. The State moved for
reconsideration and argued that the State did not present evidence of causation because
Rubbermaid's argument was limited to the failure to warn count of the complaint. Id. The State
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argued that the district court improperly relied on causation to dismiss all the counts in the

complaint rather than restricting it to the claim for failure to warn. Id.
Though the Cornt acknowledged that Rubbermaid only raised causation in association
with the failure to warn claim in the initial summary judgment motion, it held that the State
waived its right to object based on "the entire course of conduct during the summary judgment
proceedings." Id. at 618. Rubbermaid briefed the issue of causation as to all claims for the
district court in its reply brief. Id. The Court ruled that though causation was not initially raised
that the State "missed every opportunity to object before the district court." Id at 619.

Chamberlain cannot credibly argue that the issue of similar communities was raised in his
Second Motion for Summary Judgment. In his reply briefing Chamberlain conceded that he
never met his evidentiary burden to show the absence of triable issues on similarity:
Additionally, even if the standard of care in Idaho Falls for general surgeons was
indeterminable, Plaintiff has just assumed that Twin Falls is a similar community for
purposes of determining the relevant health care standards. Plaintiff has provided this
Court with no facts upon which to base such a determination. Whether Twin Falls is a
similar commtmity in terms of standard of health care practice is a factual question and
there is no evidence in the record on that issue.
(R Vol. II, p. 245.) Chamberlain's statement does nothing to establish the absence of triable
issues. His statements are conclusory and are not evidence. Chamberlain has no affidavit from an
expert witness or from even Chamberlain himself that states Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are not
similar communities. In order for Chamberlain to be entitled to summary judgment on the
similarity issue he should have moved for summary judgment on that issue and submitted
affidavits in support of the motion. See IDAHO R. Clv. P. 56(c). Allowing the moving party to
expand the scope of a motion for summary judgment to include issues argued solely in reply
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briefing constitutes an unfair shitting of a crucial evidentiary burden to a non-moving party while
also fr1iling to afford the non-moving party with any meaningful chance to respond. See
McDaniel v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr .. 869 F.Supp. 445,453 (S.D. Miss. 1994). It is an issue of

fundamental fairness and due process. The district court should have just decided the issue
before it on the Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
C. The district court erred in striking Scoma's Affidavit.
1. Standard of Review
The decision to admit expert testimony is a discretionary decision for the district court.
Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (Idaho 2007). Admissibility of expert

testimony is also a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned
absent an abuse of that discretion. Athay v. Stacey, 128 P.3d 897, 903 (Idaho 2005). When the
Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial com1, the sequence of inquiry is: ( 1)
whether the trial court conectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by the exercise of reason. Id
2. Argument
The district court abused its discretion when it struck the Affidavit of Dr. Scoma in its
decision granting Chamberlain's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. (R Vol. II, pp. 405-14.)
It did so by failing to apply the applicable legal standards to its choices and not exercising
reason. Athay, 128 P.3d at 903. The district court struck the affidavit on two grounds: (1) no
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evidence that Twin Falls and Idaho 1-'alls were similar communities; and, (2) therefr,re that
Scoma "failed to familiarize himself with the local standard of care:' (R Vol. II, pp. 405-14.)
Initially, as will be discussed in Section D, in.fi-a, there is no Idaho law addressing what

evidence a plaintiff needs to present to establish that two Idaho communities are similar. That
issue, however, was not before the district court as a basis to strike Scoma's affidavit. Other
jurisdictions have addressed it, including Tennessee, which is the jurisdiction the district court
eventually relied upon to deny Wicket's Motion for Reconsideration. (See id., Vol. III, p. 536.)
Even if Wickel waived the similar community analysis as discussed in Sections B and D, the
infonnation before the district court established triable issues of fact as to the similarity of Twin

Falls and Idaho Falls for purposes of the standard of health care practice at summary judgment.
The district court inappropriately treated similarity of communities as a foundational
issue in order for an expert witness to testify in a case where the standard of care in the
community where the health care was provided is indeterminable. As noted by the district court,

similarity is an issue to be decided by thejury. (R Vol., II, p. 412.) Scorna's affidavit presented
the district court with several facts that when viewed in a light most favorable to Wickel could
reasonably be construed to establish that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are similar communities.
The facts presented in paragraph 5 of the affidavit included the presence of general surgeons in
both locations performing identical health care services and procedures during the relevant time
period. (Id., Vol. I, pp. 95-105.) Scoma testified that based on his conversation with Schmid
about the PPH procedure that he determined that the standard of care was consistent with the
national standard of care. (Id.) Chamberlain's concession that the standard of care would be
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based on what a similarly situated board certified general surgeon would do should have
obviated the application of the local standard of care statute in any event.
The district court also erred when it applied improper law to Scoma's affidavit. It ruled:
Idaho law also allows an expert to familiarize himself by speaking to a local specialist id.,
but there must be facts to demonstrate that the local specialist knew the standard of care.
Dulaney v. 5i't. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. In this case, Dr. Scoma spoke with
Dr. Schmid, but there are no facts to support that Dr. Schmid was aware of the standard
of care. Dr. Scoma never inquired about Dr. Schmid's use of the PPH device, his training
on the PPH device, how he diagnosed anal fissures, and informed consent. Dr. Schmid
simple (sic) said that the standard of care was the national standard of care, but offered no
foundation for his opinion. Dr. Schmid's statement that the local standard was the
national standard is conclusory and without facts to support his actual knowledge, it is
insufficient. 11
(R Vol. II, pp. 412-13.) The district court's finding confused Schmid's role in the litigation with
that of Scoma' s and failed to give all favorable inferences to Wicke 1, the nonrnoving party. The
district court should have accepted Scoma' s affidavit as true and determined whether the
affidavit generates triable issues. Watts v. Lynn, 870 P.2d 1300, 1305-06 (Idaho 1994). If the
affidavit generated triable issues, then Chamberlain's motion should have been denied.
Because the district court held that the standard of care for Idaho Falls was
indeterminable, even if the Court upholds the waiver argument, Scoma consulted with a "local
physician," i.e., one in Twin Falls, and this consultation is more than sufficient to provide
foundation. "A common means for an out-of-area expert to obtain knowledge of the local

11 Wicke! suggests that Schmid's statement that the local standard and the national standard are the same is not
conclusory but rather an acknowledgement that training and use of the PPH device is standardized across
communities. This is supported by the fact that Schmid and Chamberlain were both trained by the same physician,
Dr. Eyring, who was a physician hired by the PPH manufacturer, Ethicon, to train surgeons how to use the device.
It is not an unreasonable inference that Dr. Eyring trains everyone on the Ethicon exactly the same and that any
differences in use are attributable to the relative skill of the trainee surgeon not where the device is used.
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standard of care is by inquiring of a local specialist."' Perry v. A.fagic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 995
P .2d 8 I 6, 821 (Idaho 2002). This Court has previously frmnd that affidavits that simply state that

the expert conferred with a local physician and was aware of no deviations from the national
standard provided sufficient foundation for the expert's opinion under Section 6-1012. See Watts,
870 P.2d at 1306; see also Kozlowski v. Rush, 828 P.2d 854 (Idaho 1992). In Wat!s, the Court
accepted as sufficient an afiidavit from an expert that stated "[the expertJ familiarized himself
with community standards for the relevant time period by conferring with a local dentist and was
aware ofno deviation from the national standards." Watts, 870 P.2d at 1306.
The same conditions exist in this case that exist in Walts. Schmid is not Wickel' s retained

expert. Schmid' s statements to Scoma should not be tested under the Rules of Evidence nor are
they required to be admissible at trial. As an expert witness, Scoma may properly rely on facts,
statements, including hearsay, or other evidence that would not ordinarily be admissible under
the Rules of Evidence. See

IDAHO

R. Evro. 703 (2013).

In striking Scoma's affidavit, the district court cited an absence of facts demonstrating
that Schmid knew the standard of care. (R Vol. I, pp. 96-97.) Chamberlain never disputed
whether Schmid had actual knowledge of the Twin Falls standard of care. He only challenged
Schmid's knowledge of the Idaho Falls standard of care, which was later demonstrated to be
indeterminable. There was never a dispute whether Schmid and Chamberlain practiced the same
discipline: general surgery. (Id., pp. 96-97; 153-57 .) There was never a dispute whether Schmid
practiced in Twin Falls, Idaho during 2010. (Id., pp. 96-97.) There was no dispute whether
Schmid performed hemorrhoidectomies using the Ethicon PPH device in January 2010. (Id.)
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Contrary to the district comt's findings, Scoma's testimony established adequate
familiarity with the Twin Falls standard of care for purposes of this case. Schmid, the local
general surgeon, did not need to testify in order for the Court to qualify Scoma. This Court has
never required local, consulting physicians to testify in medical malpractice cases; instead, the
Court has allowed for out-of-area experts to become familiar with the applicable standards of
care through consultation with a local physician. See, e.g., Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr.,
45 P.3d 816, 820 (Idaho 2002); Peny, 995 P.2d at 821. The district court's ruling was

tantamount to legal precedent that a local Idaho physician does not inherently have knowledge

about the local standard of care for his own medical discipline within the community where he or
she practices medicine. That cannot be an accurate statement of the law and is patently absurd.
The evidence showed that Schmid practiced general surgery, performed hemorrhoidectomies,
performed hemorrhoidectomies using the Ethicon PPH device, and practiced medicine during
2010. This Court has never required consulting physicians to disclose fellowships, high school
GP As, MCAT scores, or any other minutiae that could ever possibly bear on the issue of
knowledge of the standard of care. The focus has to be on the physician's practice, the time
period of the practice, and the scope of the practice. So long as the physician is "local" to the
relevant community, practices the same discipline, is familiar with the procedure--or in this case
surgical device-at issue, and has knowledge as to the correct time period, then the local
physician can provide foundation to the out-of-area expert vis-a-vis the standard of care. See
Arregui v. Gallegos-Alain, 291 P.3d 1000, 1008 (Idaho 2012).

Appellant Brief 26

This case is ditforent than Arregui. In Arregui, the out-of-area expert, Dr. Tamai,
submitted an affidavit. Id. Tamai's affidavit did not identify the local chiropractor she had
consulted with, did not describe the type of practice the local chiropractor ran, or how he became
familiar with the local standard of care, how long he had practiced in Nampa-Caldwell, or
whether he was familiar with tmiicollis and the specific procedure used on the plaintiff in that
case. Id. Here, the district court knew the identity of the local physician with whom Scoma
consulted. (R Vol. I, pp. 96-97.) The district court knew that Schmid is general surgeon whose
practice included the performance of hemorrhoidectomies using the PPH device. (Id.) The
district court knew that Schmid has been doing the procedure, at the very least, since 2010, the
time-period in question. (Id.) Scoma told the district court in his affidavit that Schmid is familiar
with the disease that was treated: hemorrhoids. (Id.) Scoma's affidavit also states that Schmid
disclosed he performed the same procedure, PPH, as Chamberlain. (Id.) In sum, the evidence
missing in Arregui existed in this case and provided foundation for Scoma.
Scoma testified that Schmid discussed the hemorrhoidectomy procedure with Scoma and
did not identify deviations from the national standard of care. (Id., p. 195.) Schmid, the actual
general surgeon in the Twin Falls community, told Scoma that the procedure, as practiced in
Twin Falls, was the same as the national standard of care. (Id.) Schmid's statement to Scoma is
consistent with Chamberlain's own deposition testimony where he said that he has not altered the
method of performing the PPH procedure from the time he was trained in Salt Lake City and that
he would perform the procedure the same way regardless oflocation. (Id., p. 161.)
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The facts in this case are also fi.mdamenially different than those in Dulaney. 45 P.3d 816
(ldaho 2002). Dulaney involved

an

out-of-area doctor attempting

local standard of care by talking with

a

to

familiarize himself with the

local physician. Id. at 820. In Dulaney,

no

evidence

existed that established that the local doctor actively practiced or had ever practiced the
discipline of emergency medicine, which was the medical specialty at issue. Id. at 822. The

Dulaney majority held that "there are no facts showing, however, that Dr. Smith had knowledge
of the standard of care for emergency room physicians in Boise ... there is no evidence that he

has ever practiced emergency medicine while in Boise." Id.
This case differs from Dulaney because Chamberlain never challenged the adequacy or
sufficiency of Schmid's familiarity with the Twin Falls standard of care. The evidence before the
Court also established that Schmid (a) actively practices as a general surgeon in Twin Falls and
was practicing as a general surgeon in 2010, (b) used the PPH device in performing
hemorrhoidectomies, and ( c) performed hemorrhoidectomies with the PPH device in 2010. (R
Vol. I, pp. 96-97, 195.) The evidence missing in Dulaney exists in this case. In reaching its
decision, the district court failed to consider the evidence it had before it.
The second expert in Dulaney was Dr. William Stump, another out-of-area expert. Dr.
Stump had a conversation with a Dr. Adomato, a Boise-based neurologist, about the standard of
care in Boise for emergency room physicians and orthopedic surgeons. Dulaney, 45 P.3d at 824.
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled he lacked foundation because there was no evidence that Dr.
Adornato ever practiced emergency medicine or orthopedics. Id. The Dulaney court wrote:
There are no facts showing, however, that Dr. Adomato had knowledge of the standard of
care for those medical specialties. We cannot assume that by practicing neurology in
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Boise, Dr. Adornato would have become familiar with the standard of care for emergency
room physicians and orthopedic surgeons.

Id. There was also no evidence that Dr. Adornato had become familiar with the standard of care

for the specialties before speaking with Dr. Stump, which he could have done. Id As noted,
supra, this case is entirely different because there is evidence that Schmid knew the procedure at

issue, had performed the procedure, and had knowledge of the standard of care for the procedure
during 2010. This is unlike the evidence presented for Dr. Adornato in Dulaney. Thus, the
district court abused its discretion when it struck the Affidavit of Dr. Scoma in its decision

granting Chamberlain's Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
D. The district court erred in finding that Wickel did not submit evidence
generating triable issues that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are similar communities.
The issue of how a party adduces evidence that an Idaho community is similar to the
community wherein the alleged malpractice occurred is one of first impression in Idaho. Since
1976, the Court has never been called upon to construe the language and application of the
second to last sentence ofldaho Code Section 6-1012. That sentence reads:
If there be no other like provider in the community and the standard of practice is
therefore indeterminable, evidence of such standard in similar Idaho communities at said
time may be considered.

IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-1012 (2013). In Hoene v. Barnes, 828 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1992), the Court
came close to providing guidance about how a plaintiff proves similarity of an Idaho community.
The facts of Hoene did not necessitate a finding or description how one proves similarity of
Idaho communities for purposes of the standard of health care practice. Id. at 317.
First, and most compelling, it is unclear how a plaintiff can establish similarity of

Appellant Brief 29

standards when one community's standard of health care practice must he first deemed to he
indeterminable before finding a "similar" community standard.
Second, once the district court ruled that "the local standard of care was indeterminable
and, in accordance with Hoene, Dr. Scoma was allowed to familiarize himself with the standard
of care in a similar community." (R Vol. II, p. 412.) This ruling was based on the totality of the
evidence before the district court, i.e., that Chamberlain and his partners were the only ones who
performed PPH during January 2010 (R Vol. I, p. 166), and that Jessica Wilson, a BSG paralegal,
had called every available general surgeon in Idaho Falls and Pocatello, and none of them used
the PPH or were willing to speak with Dr. Scoma. (Id., pp. 106-8).
Wickel asserts that based on how the summary judgment motion was brought, i.e., based
solely on the issue of the Idaho Falls standard of care, that is where the district court's ruling

should have stopped and the motion should have been denied. The district court went beyond the
scope of the summary judgment motion when it ruled there was no evidence that Twin Falls and
Idaho Falls are similar communities and Scoma's testimony lacked foundation. (Id., Vol. II, p.
412.) The district court's decision was wrong, both procedurally and substantively.
Assuming, arguendo, that the district court was justified in going beyond ruling the
standard of care was indeterminable its analysis of the "similarity" rule was incorrect. In Weekly
v. Solomon, 510 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. App. 1987), the comi considered Illinois' similar locality rule.

Id. at 155. The Appellate Court of Illinois considered the case of Marlene Weekly where a Dr.

Solomon performed a "gastric stapling" procedure on Ms. Weekly in Lake County, Illinois. Id. at
154. The plaintiff attempted to admit the testimony of a Dr. Daniel Radecki, who was a general
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surgeon practicing in Toledo, Ohio. Id. Radecki had not spoken with "any doctors who practiced
in Lake County or who performed the variety of the Pace procedure used on the plaintiff." Id.
Radecki opined that there was a national standard of care for Ms. Wcekly's procedure. Id.
The defendant moved to exclude Radecki on the basis that the plaintiff had not
established similarity between Toledo, Ohio and Waukegan, Illinois. Id. The defendant also
argued that there was no national standard of care because there were differences of opinion
about stapling technique. Id. The plaintiff appealed the district court's decision to exclude
Radecki and grant directed verdict to the defendant, Dr. Solomon. Id. at 155.
The Weekly court considered the issue of similarity. It wrote:
'Similar locality' is defined in terms of the medical conditions and facilities available to
the physician. In Purtill v. Hess, [489 N.E.2d 867 (Ill. 1986)] the court noted that the
similar locality rule requires comparison of the available medical facilities for
examination and treatment, the presence or absence of specialists and other medical
personnel for consultation and assistance, and other variables.
ld. 12 The Weekly court ultimately excluded Radecki's testimony for lack of foundation. Id.

Another Illinois decision, Hansbrough v. Kosyak, 490 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1986), explained, "the
term 'locality' itself has no precise meaning, and varies with the facts of each particular case." Id.
at 186. "The applicable locality should be narrowed no further than necessary to promote the
rationale of the rule." Id. (emphasis added). In Chamness v. Odum, 399 N.E.2d 238 (Ill. 1979),
the Illinois Appellate Court considered whether a physician from the greater St. Louis
metropolitan area could testify in a case involving a chiropractor practicing in a relatively rural
area known as Anna-Jonesboro. Id. In deciding whether the locality of the expert's practice was
12

Toledo has an approximate population of286,000 whereas Waukegan's population is approximately 89,000.
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similar, the ( 'hamness court looked to the educational background of the chiropractor and the
expert along with the knowledge available to the local practitioner to rule that the expert could
testify and that the St. Louis metropolitan standard of care qualified as a similar locality. Id.
In this case, the district court had sutlicicnt evidence generating triable issues of fact
whether Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are similar communities for purposes of Section 6-1012.
Scoma's affidavit put evidence into the record wherein a reasonable jury could infer that Twin
Falls and Idaho Falls had similar medical facilities to perform the PPH procedure. The affidavit
also presented the Comt with evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Twin Falls
and Idaho Falls enjoyed the services of similar health care providers and doctors related to the
treatment of hemorrhoids with the PPH procedure. For example, Scoma testified that the
consulting physician, Dr. Schmid, was a general surgeon practicing in Twin Falls. (R Vol. I, p.
96.) This is not just a similar class of health care provider as Chamberlain but the same class of
health care provider. (Id., p. 40.) The Court had evidence that both Twin Falls and Idaho Falls
had practitioners who could perform the PPH procedure in January 2010 in their respective
communities. (Id., pp. 40, 96.) A reasonable inference from this fact is that both communities had
similar medical facilities that could accommodate the PPH procedure and, more generally,
hemorrhoidectomies. Also, the evidence in the record at summary judgment established that
Ethicon was the sole manufacturer of a PPH device in 2010. (Id., p. 160.) Scoma testified that he
and Schmid discussed the use of the PPH procedure for treating hemorrhoids during January
2010. (Id., p. 96.) A reasonable, and in fact the only conclusion, is that both Schmid and
Chamberlain used the Ethicon device in a similar fashion during January 2010 which can be
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inferred from the fact that Chamberlain and Schmid were both trained in an identical fashion to
use the Ethicon device to perform the hemorrhoidcctomy in 2010. The foregoing inferences were

sufficient to generate triable issues of material fact whether Twin Falls and Idaho Falls were
similar communities under Section 6-1012 during the proceedings on summary judgment.
On reconsideration, the district court acknowledged the absence of Idaho law concerning
"the standard for determining whether two communities are similar" and relied on a Tennessee
case: Shipley.~ Williams, 350 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 2011). (R Vol. III, p. 536.) 13 Though stating that
"states" had addressed the issue, the district court cited only one case. (Id.) In Shipley, however,
the Tennessee Supreme Court commented that "the [Tennessee] statute does not require a

particular means or manner of proving what constitutes a 'similar community,' nor does it define
that tenn." Id. at 552. The general categories of information cited by the district court are listed
only as examples of facts that could bear on the issue of similarity. They are not, however,
dispositive. Id. Under Shipley, an expert could familiarize himself with information to provide
competent testimony about a similar community. Id. at 552-53. Conversing with a medical
provider in the community is listed as one means for doing so. Id. at 553. Additionally, Shipley
recognizes that testimony regarding a "broader regional standard or a national standard should
not be barred, but should be considered as an element of the expert witness' knowledge of the

standard of care in the same or similar community." Id. (emphasis added).

Scoma's supplemental affidavits address any lingering concerns that the district court
may have had both in terms of use of the PPH device and the similarity of practice between
13

In fact, in response to the Motion for Reconsideration, Chamberlain cited no cases to support any argument about
how a party establishes similarity among communities. The Shipley case was found by the district court on its own.
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Chamberlain and Schmid. In his supplemental atlidavits, Scoma explained that Schmid used the
Eth icon device in 20 IO and was familiar with its use. (R Vol. Ill, p. 420-22, 577-84.) Scoma
testified that Dr. Eyring in Salt Lake City trained Schmid on the Ethicon PPH device. (Id.)
Scoma testified that Dr. Schmid's ability to use the PPH device in Twin Falls was not inhibited or
limited based on the fact that Schmid is located in Twin Falls. (Id.) Scoma testified that based on
his conversation with Schmid there was nothing "unique or special" about how the PPH
hemorrhoidectomy was performed in Twin Falls during 2010. (Id.) Schmid told Scoma that the
standard of care for general surgeons in Twin Falls at during 2010 would be the same
nationwide. (Id.) In short, these facts, when coupled with Scoma's initial affidavit, generate
triable issues of fact under the both Weekly and Shipley as to the similarity of Twin Falls and
Idaho Falls. A jury should have been allowed to hear the evidence and then answer the question
when issuing its verdict. The district court, however, usurped the province of the jury when it
decided these issues of fact without justification both on summary judgment and during
reconsideration. The Court should reverse and remand the matter for trial.
Another fact that the district court ignored is Olson's IME report where he notes that
placing the staple line lower than 2cm from the dentate line was not standard within the Boise
community. (R Vol. I, pp. 173-88.) His report is evidence of another Idaho community's standard
that should have been considered for purposes of establishing a similar community's standard.
As noted the Scoma second supplemental affidavit dealt with all of the concerns
articulated by the district court. (See R Vol. III, pp. 577-84.) Had the district court properly
applied the law and the rules the result would have been different.

Appellant Brief 34

E. The district court erred by not applying a national standard of care.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6-1012, this Court has recognized that when
the national standard of care has supplanted any local standard that evidence of the national
standard of care will be admissible during trial. See Watts, 870 P.2d at 1306; see also Kozlowski
v. Rush, 828 P.2d 854 ( 1992). In Watts, the Court accepted as sufficient an affidavit from an

expert that stated "[the expert] familiarized himself with community standards for the relevant
time period by conferring with a local dentist and was aware of no deviation from the national
standards." Watts, 870 P.2d at 1306.

Here, Scoma consulted with a local physician and based on the conversation with the
local physician, Scoma determined that there were no deviations from a national standard of
care. In other words, the standard of treatment employed by physicians in Twin Falls was
coextensive with the standard of care provided on a national level. There were no idiosyncrasies
present in Twin Falls that would require the use of a lower standard.
The original purpose behind the locality rules was to prevent small-town practitioners
from being held to the standards of more sophisticated urban areas. See Robbins v. Footer, 553
F.2d 123, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The increasingly antiquated assumption of the locality rule is that
the rural practitioner has less access to the latest medical information, and less experience, than
urban doctors. Id. The D.C. Circuit explained that the locality rule could conceptually immunize
small-town doctors who are the sole practitioner in his or her community. Id. This led to the
development of the "similar community" standard that is found in many locality statutes,
including Idaho's. The Robbins court explained the reason for modifying the locality rule:
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This modification presented no conceptual problem but its practical application generated
continual ditficultics in deciding whether two localities were similar. Although for at least
one court geographic proximity played an important role the focus of decision
quickly moved away from strictly geographic factors towards general socioeconomic
variables. The modem trend, and now the majority view, is to consider factors directly
related to the practice of medicine. Under this majority rule, the court considers whether
the medicalfi1cilities ol the locality on which a proffered expert witness will base his
testimony are comparable to those available in the defendant's community.
Id. at 128 (emphasis added). 14 It would seem that where three practitioners, such as in this case,

Chamberlain, Scoma and Schmid, who perform the same procedure with an identical medical

device in the same type of facility, i.e., outpatient care, are virtually indistinguishable. This
commonality becomes even more salient when the same doctor trained two of the practitioners,
Chamberlain and Schmid, 15 on the device. Parsing the differences between these three physicians
becomes an attempt to distinguish them on increasingly minute and meaningless factors-factors
that have nothing to do with the practice of medicine.
Wicke! submits that time and the reality of the medical practice have passed by Section 61012. In cases where the defendant physician holds himself or herself out as a nationally ce1iified
medical specialist like Dr. Chamberlain, the locality rule simply should not apply. As a specialist,
Chamberlain should be "required to exercise that degree of care and skill expected of a
reasonably competent practitioner in his specialty in the same or similar circumstances."

14 The Robbins Court observed that the locality rule "carries with it the unstated assumption that some characteristics
of a geographically defined area justify a different and perhaps lower standard of care in the exercise of medical
judgment than the standard followed in localities which do not share those characteristics. In nineteenth century
America the validity of this assumption may have been obvious enough for courts to accept without empirical proof.
Its continuing validity in our age of ubiquitous national communication networks both within and without the
medical profession is extremely doubtful." Id. at 128. The continuing efficacy of the locality statute clearly fails to
reflect reality. This was the case in 1977 and it is especially the case in the 21st Century.

15

Both are board certified in general surgery.

Appellant Brief 36

Robbins, 553 F2d at 129. Chamberlain acknowledged as much when he testified that the
standard of care would be based on a similarly situated general surgeon as himself. (Id. p. 171.)
J\s a national board certified general surgeon, the locality rule has no bearing on his practice of
medicine. Thus, the district court erred by not applying a national standard of care.
F. The district court erred dismissing the entirety of Wicket's case.
The district court dismissed Wickers informed consent claim; however, there were triable
issues of fact on those claims that were never analyzed or addressed by the district court.
Chamberlain never considered the foregoing procedures when he started performing surgery on
Wickel in January 2010. At the time of the surgery in January 2010, Chamberlain had only
diagnosed Wickcl with internal and external hemorrhoids. (R Vol. I, p. 163.) The original intent
of the surgery was to perform a hemorrhoidectomy for both internal and external hemorrhoids.

(Id., p. 164.) Chamberlain never disclosed the procedures, including any benefits or risks of the
procedures. He unilaterally decided to perform them on Wickel without ever discussing them
with Wicke 1. Wicke I never would have consented to the procedures had he been informed of the
risks of the procedure. (App. Ex. 2, pp. 714-16.) According to Scoma, the performance of the
fissurectomy and sphincterotomy harmed Wickel.
A claim based on insufficiency of consent is based on Idaho Code Section 39-4506. The
statute provides:
Consent, or refusal to consent, for the furnishing of health care, treatment or procedures
shall be valid in all respects if the person giving or refusing the consent is sufficiently
aware of pe1iinent facts respecting the need for, the nature of, and the significant risks
ordinarily attendant upon such a person receiving such care, as to permit the giving or
withholding of such consent to be a reasonably informed decision. Any such consent
shall be deemed valid and so informed if the health care provider to whom it is given or

Appellant Brief 37

by whom it is secured has made such disclosures and given such advice respecting
pertinent facts and considerations as would ordinarily be made and given under the same
or similar circumstances, by a like health care provider of good standing practicing in the
same community. As used in this section, the term "in the same community" refers to
that geographic area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital or nearest to which
such consent is given.
ID Al 10 Com: ANN.

§ 39-4506. The statute establishes an "objective, professional medical

standard for disclosure.'' Sherwood v. Carter, 805 P.2d 452,461 (Idaho 1991), overruled on other

grounds by Verska v. St. Alphonsus Med Ctr., 265 P.3d 502 (Idaho 2011 ).
"To establish a claim based on the doctrine of informed consent, a patient must prove
three basic elements: nondisclosure, causation, and injury:' Id. at 463. "In order to show

causation, the patient must prove that if he had been informed of the material risks, he would not
have consented to the procedure, and that he had been injured as a result of submitting to the
medical procedure." Id.
Triable issues of material fact existed on every element of the claim. It was never in
dispute whether Chamberlain had failed to diagnose the anal fissure at the time he commenced
Wickel's surgery in January 2010. (R Vol. I, p. 164.) Upon seeing the fissure, Chamberlain
performed the fissurectomy and internal lateral sphincterotomy without bringing Wickel out of
anesthesia first to obtain his consent to the new procedures. (Id., pp. 40-46; 149; & 164-65.)
When Wickel consented to the surgery he did not know that an anal fissure was something that
would need to be treated through a different procedure than the one to which he consented. (Id.,
p. 149.) When Wickel learned that his sphincter muscle had been cut as a part of the
sphincterotomy he was understandably shocked and fearful. (Id., p. 150.) Wickel testified that
Chamberlain never discussed the risks of the fissurectomy or the sphincterotomy prior to his
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surgery in Janumy 20 l 0. (id, p.151.) To add insult to injury, if a doctor takes it upon himself to
make unnecessary, unilateral medical decisions for a patient, it should at least be incumbent upon
the doctor to make the right decision and perform the subsequent procedure correctly.
There were triable issues of fact whether there were any disclosures made by
Chamberlain about the two additional procedures performed on Wickel during January 2010.
Consents are only valid if the person giving the consent is "sufficiently aware of pertinent facts

respecting the need for, the nature of, and the significant risks ordinarily attendant upon a person
receiving such care." IDAIIO CODE ANN. § 39-4506. Wickel could not be '·sufficiently aware" of
the risks associated with the procedures because Chamberlain never discussed them and did not
know of their necessity before operating on WickeL Chamberlain's own affidavit and deposition
fail to suggest that he discussed the need, nature, and risks of the procedures with Wicke 1. In the
absence of contrary facts, there were triable issues of fact as to the element of nondisclosure and
the district court en-ed in granting summary judgment on the claim. The existence of a generic
written consent fonn does not, as a matter of law, establish that Wickel was fully informed as to
the foregoing facts about a sphincterotomy or fissurectomy. The sphincterotomy is a vastly
different procedure than a hemon-hoidectomy. The sphincterotomy involves actually cutting the
sphincter muscle to allow relaxation of the muscles and encourage healing. (R Vol. I, p. 165.)
There were also triable issues as to causation. Wickel has testified that had he been fully
informed of the need, nature, and risks of a fissurectomy and sphincterotomy, he never would
have consented to the procedures. (App. Ex. 2, pp. 714-16.) Wickel did not want his sphincter
muscle cut. (Id.) The procedure he did consent to did not involve the cutting of the sphincter
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muscle and was not a lissurectomy. Wickel's testimony is the only evidence before the court as
to what he would have clone had the requisite infom1ation been disclosed prior to the procedures.

l lis affidavit generated triable issues of material fact whether a reasonable person would have
chosen no treatment or a different course of treatment had he been adequately informed. See

Sherwood, 805 P.2d at 465.
Scoma also was familiar with the standard of care and has testified as to what information

physicians should provide to patients before surgeries or procedures. (R Vol.

t pp. 95-105.) The

atlidavit expressly addresses Sherwood's suggestion that there be physician testimony about

what should be disclosed to patients prior to procedures. Scoma has testified that there has to be
a discussion of the specific procedures in order to give or withhold meaningful consent before
any such consent can be deemed informed. (Id.) This testimony generated triable issues of fact.
There are also triable issues as to whether Wickel was injured because the lack of
informed consent. Scoma's affidavit establishes that the performance of the sphincterotomy
"double injured" Wickel and that the double injury was unnecessary. (Id.) The dilation of the anal
canal coupled with the sphincterotomy injured Wickel in a way that should never have occun-ed.
(Id.) The entirety of Scoma's opinions directly rebuts the notion of lack of causation and injury.

Chamberlain never asserted that there was an absence of triable issues as to the last
element of the informed consent claim. This Court has ruled:
On a motion for swnmary judgment, "[t]he burden of proving the absence of material
facts is upon the moving party. Once the moving party establishes the absence of a
genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of
material fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist." Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho
81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003). "[I]faparty moving for summary judgment raises issues in
his motion but then fails to provide any evidence showing a lack of any genuine issue of
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material fact with respect to those issues, the nonmoving party has no burden to respond
with supporting evidence." Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency. Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 531, 887
P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994).

,<..,'he/ion v. Shelton, 225 P.3d 693, 698 (Idaho 2009). In this case, Chamberlain presented no
evidence to the court that establishes the absence of triable issues as to injury. Therefore, the
district comt eITed in granting summary judgment dismissing the informed consent claim.

IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing, the district court eITed by dismissing Wickel's case. This
Court should reverse the district court and remand for trial on the merits.
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